Since the beginning of our operations against al Qaeda in Afghanistan, I have strongly supported our troops in the field and their commitment to fighting international terrorism.  However, I have become increasingly concerned about recent policy suggestions to expand today’s mission beyond counterterrorism into the arena of nation-building, and to dramatically increase the size of the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan.  It is imperative that these recommendations be considered carefully in terms of unintended consequences and the implications for our long-term national security interests throughout the world. 

I have expressed these concerns repeatedly since early 2009, in the media and also as a member of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees here in the Senate.  Countering international terrorism requires highly maneuverable forces able to strike an intrinsically mobile enemy.  The departure of al Qaeda from Iraq and, in large measure from Afghanistan as well, demonstrates why more maneuverable U.S. forces are to be favored against mobile international terrorist movements.  In each instance, al Qaeda relocated to other areas, including Pakistan and the Horn of Africa.  It is important that our military retain the same maneuverability. 

As I wrote just after the September 11, 2001 attacks, when combating the forces of international terrorism, it is important that our military not become bogged down as an occupying force, particularly in Southwest Asia.  The more territory our forces are called upon to defend or occupy, the more difficult it will be for them to carry out their broader mission.  This is precisely what happened in Iraq, where the United States military became bogged down as an occupying force while Al Qaeda relocated back to Pakistan.

With this in mind, the U.S. strategy for Afghanistan must proceed based on the following realities: 

1. the fragility of the Afghani government;
2. whether building a national army of a considerable scale is achievable;
3. whether an increased U.S. military presence will ultimately have a positive effect in the country, or whether we will be seen as an occupying force; and
4. the linkage of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

In addition, our future strategy must be framed with clearly defined and attainable goals, an understandable endpoint, and a regional perspective.  And we must avoid the inherent risks in allowing our success in Afghanistan to be defined by events that are largely beyond our ability to control.

At the time of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, no true central government had existed since 1979.  The Afghan agreements in Bonn in December 2001 led to a new constitution, an interim government, and the national election of 2004. The agreements also gave considerably more power to a central government in a country that is very disparate and far removed from the concept of central governance over its history. The result today is a weak, fragile Afghani central government whose power on paper is far greater than in reality. Many observers now say that power needs to be devolved to a more decentralized form of governance consistent with tribal realities to achieve the Afghani government’s long-term viability.

The feasibility of building a larger Afghani national army in the absence of a strong, viable central government is uncertain.  The number of Afghan troops is scheduled to increase to 134,000 by October 2010.  The Afghan police are scheduled to increase to a level of 82,000 by that time. There have been calls to expand and accelerate this growth to create an Afghan Army of 240,000 troops and 160,000 Afghan police by 2013.  This is an unprecedented challenge for a country that has fielded an effective national army for only a few decades; even then, the Afghan army only numbered approximately 90,000 troops.

Calls for substantial increases in the numbers of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Afghanistan to implement a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy ignore the risk, well-rooted in Afghanistan’s history, that the United States will be perceived as an occupying force.  The construction of large military structures such as those in Iraq and now in Afghanistan has tied down U.S. forces—in strategic and financial terms—while international terrorist units have remained mobile.  Moreover, the United States could soon reach a point where our military presence and operations may become counterproductive—allowing the Taliban and other insurgents to rally popular opposition to our presence.

U.S. strategy also must reflect the reality that events in Afghanistan and Pakistan are inseparably linked.  The stability and security of Pakistan are of vital concern to U.S. strategic interests, as al Qaeda and Taliban militants continue to find safe haven in unguarded border areas and to expand their attacks aimed at destabilizing the country’s elected government.  It is important for the United States to improve its relationship with Pakistan, as demonstrated by the passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, which I supported.  In turn, however, the Pakistani government also owes this partnership considerably greater transparency in terms of both the nature of its cooperation and its accountability in delivering aid to its intended recipients.

Before we move forward with a major change in policy toward Afghanistan, we need a vigorous and transparent debate to examine our strategic goals and what is achievable.  The administration is wisely conducting a comprehensive review of its strategy.  We should be careful not to rush to judgment until this review has been completed.  If a revised strategy is proposed, Congress will then have the opportunity to perform its constitutional oversight role in evaluating it.  Our national security and the welfare of our men and women in uniform demand this deliberative approach to address a complex issue carrying significant long-range implications for our nation.